Hydrocarbon leakage and inadequate process safety management led to an explosion at this California refinery, CSB says.

CSB稱(chēng)，油氣泄漏和工藝安全管理的不足導致了加利福尼亞煉油廠(chǎng)的爆炸。

Credit: CSB

美國化學(xué)安全委員會(huì )稱(chēng)風(fēng)險管理的漏洞導致了爆炸

美國化學(xué)安全委員會(huì )（CSB）在報告中提到，基本工藝安全管理的錯誤（所有美國煉油廠(chǎng)的一些共同現象）導致了位于加利福利亞托倫斯的?？松梨跓捰蛷S(chǎng)2015年事故的發(fā)生。

CSB主席Vanessa Allen Sutherland說(shuō)，?？松梨跓捰蛷S(chǎng)缺乏恰當的風(fēng)險管理制度，這意味著(zhù)“工人們基本上是盲目地在運行每個(gè)工藝單元。”

事故造成四名工人受傷，無(wú)人重傷。爆炸造成碎片橫飛，一些盛裝氫氟酸（HF）的桶從天而降。許多煉油廠(chǎng)在烷基化的工藝中都在使用劇毒的氫氟酸。

爆炸發(fā)生在靜電除塵器上，這是煉油廠(chǎng)空氣污染控制系統的一部分。CSB確認，未被檢測到的碳氫化合物通過(guò)流體催化裂解裝置的管道發(fā)生回流，并在除塵器中被點(diǎn)燃。報告稱(chēng)，在事故發(fā)生時(shí)，?？松梨跓捰蛷S(chǎng)已經(jīng)關(guān)閉該裂解裝置，計劃對其進(jìn)行維修，但是?？松梨跓捰蛷S(chǎng)并沒(méi)有將其與其他設備有效隔離。

CSB說(shuō)，?？松梨跓捰蛷S(chǎng)缺乏可以標志油氣泄漏的碳氫化合物檢測設備。CSB補充道，這種檢測設備的缺乏是一個(gè)全行業(yè)問(wèn)題。

事故關(guān)停了煉油廠(chǎng)，削減了一年多的產(chǎn)量。事故還加劇了附近約15萬(wàn)居民的擔憂(yōu)。

在美國，約150家煉油廠(chǎng)中的近三分之一都在使用氫氟酸。即使在極低濃度下，它也會(huì )造成人員傷害或致命。

CSB還在調查如果碎片擊中了盛氫氟酸的桶會(huì )造成的潛在影響。然而，?？松梨诠咀罱鼌s將煉油廠(chǎng)出售給了BPF控股公司，并隱瞞了CSB需要的信息，稱(chēng)這種調查超出了委員會(huì )的權限。

?？松梨诟嬖VC&EN，沒(méi)有證據表明此次事件會(huì )給社會(huì )帶來(lái)任何風(fēng)險。此起事故和2015年以來(lái)的其他四次事故之后，加利福利亞地區的監管機構已經(jīng)展開(kāi)了一項關(guān)于在煉油廠(chǎng)更換氫氟酸的研究。他們的目標是在年底前公布其研究結果。

（本文經(jīng)《化學(xué)與工程新聞》（美國化學(xué)學(xué)會(huì )）許可轉載。文章于2017年5月8日首次發(fā)表。）

U.S. Chemical Safety Board says gaps in risk management led to blast

Fundamental process safety management errors—some common to all U.S. refineries—led to a 2015 accident at an ExxonMobil refinery in Torrance, Calif., says a May 3 report from the U.S. Chemical Safety Board.

ExxonMobil’s lack of proper protocol to manage risk meant “workers were essentially running the unit blind,” says CSB Chairwoman Vanessa Allen Sutherland.

The accident injured four workers, none seriously. The explosion sent debris flying, with some landing near tanks of hydrofluoric acid (HF). Many refineries use this highly toxic chemical in the alkylation process.

The explosion occurred in the electrostatic precipitator, part of the refinery’s air pollution control system. Undetected hydrocarbons back-flowed through piping from the fluid catalytic cracking unit and ignited in the precipitator, CSB determined. At the time of the incident, the cracking unit was shut down for planned maintenance but was not sufficiently isolated from the rest of the facility, the report says.

The refinery lacked hydrocarbon detection equipment that might have flagged the leak, CSB says. The absence of such equipment is an industry-wide problem, it adds.

The accident shut down the refinery and cut output for more than a year. It also heightened fears of some 150,000 nearby residents.

HF is used in about one-third of the some 150 refineries in the U.S. It can seriously injure or kill even in small concentrations.

CSB is also investigating the potential impact if debris had hit the HF storage tanks. However, ExxonMobil, which recently sold the refinery to PBF Energy, has withheld the information CSB asked for, saying this aspect of the probe exceeds board’s authority.

The company tells C&EN there is no evidence the incident posed any risk to the community.

Following this incident and four others since the 2015 accident, regional regulators in California have launched a study to consider substitutes for HF at refineries. They are aiming to release their findings by year’s end.

This article is reproduced with permission from Chemical & Engineering News (© American Chemical Society).

The article was first published on May 8, 2017.